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ABSTRACT
 For the large number of U.S. arts organizations whose existence depends 
on private charitable donations, qualification for federal tax exemption under 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) is effectively a requirement for survival. The federal tax 
rules directly affect the vitality and direction of arts in the United States by 
determining which organizations qualify for exemption and life-giving tax 
deductible contributions. These tax rules are arguably the largest single com-
ponent of U.S. national arts policy, but because they are tucked away in pro-
visions of the federal tax code that do not even use the word “art,” they remain 
somewhat insulated from the otherwise vigorous public discourse regarding 
arts funding. § 501(c)(3) generally requires arts organizations to meet the de-
finition of “educational” in order to qualify for tax-exempt status. This is a 
problem because an exclusive focus on the demonstrably “educational” aspects 
of art undermines (or at least fails to address) the important democracy-
enhancing justifications for publicly supporting art in the first place. In par-
ticular, the requirement that tax-exempt arts organizations meet the tax law’s 
definition of educational prevents the type of diversity—and subversiveness—
that a successful arts policy should encourage and fosters the type of conser-
vatism that renders direct support for the arts an incomplete policy. Part II of 
this Article discusses the justifications for public financial support for the 
arts and the two alternatives for delivering that support—directly (exempli-
fied by the National Endowment for the Arts) and indirectly (as exemplified 
by the tax subsidy that is the subject of this Article). Part III examines the 
current interpretation of § 501(c)(3) as it applies to arts organizations and 
identifies its inadequacies in light of the reasons for publicly supporting art. 
Part IV recommends explicitly adding arts organizations to the list of those 
eligible for tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3). An explicit statutory identifi-
cation of arts organizations as deserving of tax exempt status (by virtue of be-
ing artistic rather than educational) would better protect arts funding from 
changing political winds and free arts organizations to fulfill their role in our 
democracy—resisting the tyranny of the status quo and providing a counter-
balance to headlong scientific and technological advancement. In this way, 
federal tax law can better do its part in implementing national arts policy. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 As a by-product of the interaction between American private phi-
lanthropic largesse and federal tax law, the U.S. government sup-
ports the arts not only by directly funding art organizations, but also 
through an indirect “tax subsidy.” This indirect “subsidy” is the tax 
revenue that the government forgoes when it allows a tax deduction 
(and corresponding tax exemption) for charitable contributions, in 
this case, to arts organizations.1 In fact, the government now pro-
vides as much funding to the arts via this indirect tax subsidy as via 
direct funding.2 Many discussions of arts funding mention this tax 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. See generally STAFF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, JCX-37-08 (May 12, 2008) (calling for a revised tax expenditure 
taxonomy that would explicitly include the concept of a “tax subsidy” for specific tax provi-
sions that diverge from one of tax law’s identifiable general rules and that collect less reve-
nue than such general rule). This Article focuses on the federal income tax subsidy result-
ing from the tax exemption granted to certain qualifying arts organizations and the atten-
dant deductibility by donors of charitable contributions (referred to herein as the “tax sub-
sidy”) to such organizations. While these two components of the tax subsidy are analytical-
ly and legally separate and distinct, they are at times discussed collectively (or interchan-
geably) for the purposes of this Article. Of course, many governmental policies could be ac-
curately described as indirect subsidies for the arts, including upholding law and order, 
providing for economic prosperity, participating in and encouraging free international 
trade, enforcing copyright and other intellectual property laws, and the like. Other forms of 
indirect subsidies (including tax-based subsidies via other provisions of the federal income, 
estate, property, and other tax regimes) are not discussed in detail. 
 2. In 2006, the most recent year for which reliable statistics are available, private 
donations made up 43% of nonprofit arts organizations’ funding, or $13.5 billion. NATIONAL 
ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW THE UNITED STATES FUNDS THE ARTS, 1, 18 (2d ed., 2007). 
Public direct support accounts for 13%, or $4 billion. Id. at 1, 3. However, about $1 billion 
of this public support is for cultural, rather than arts, organizations, meaning that direct 
governmental funding for the arts from all levels of government totaled around $3 billion. 
Id. at 10. This amounts to approximately 10% of the total revenue for nonprofit arts organ-
izations in the U.S., and the National Endowment for the Art’s (NEA) annual support 
equals less than 1% of such revenue. Id.
 Of that total, $12.5 billion was contributed to organizations in the arts, culture, and 
humanities. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. U., supra, at 12-13 (total private charitable 
contributions by all U.S. donors in 2006 totaled $295 billion (approximately 2.2% of GDP), 
three-quarters of which came from individuals). Forgone federal income tax revenue with 
respect to these contributions to arts organizations is approximately $3 billion—or roughly 
the same amount as all direct governmental support for the arts combined—assuming a 
blended average tax rate of 30%. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW THE 
UNITED STATES FUNDS THE ARTS, supra, at 1. Professor Cowen, in one of the few works to 
elaborate on the importance of the tax subsidy for the arts, has observed that “[t]he tax 
system provides the most significant arts subsidy in the United States.” TYLER COWEN,
GOOD & PLENTY: THE CREATIVE SUCCESSES OF AMERICAN ARTS FUNDING, 33 (2006);  see al-
so J. Mark Davidson Schuster, Issues in Supporting the Arts through Tax Incentives, 16 J.
ARTS MGMT. & L. 31 (1987) (“taxes forgone through various arts-related tax incentives pro-
vide at least three times the amount of direct aid to the arts from all levels of govern-
ment.”). More common are commentators who equate arts funding policy with only direct 
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subsidy only in passing, if at all.3 Such discussions even more rarely 
address how the tax code effectuates this subsidy for the arts—and 
whether or not it is effective.4
 Government involvement in the arts has always been a polarizing 
political issue; and it is an issue that seems to be forever current. De-
spite the prolonged and deepening worldwide financial crisis and a 
continuing global war on terror, there is vigorous ongoing debate re-
garding the general state of the arts in the United States.5 One of the 
most controversial elements of the recently passed nearly $800 bil-
lion economic stimulus bill was the $50 million of additional funding 
for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).6 The seemingly dis-
                                                                                                                                       
funding. See, e.g., SUSAN BOREN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ARTS AND HUMANITIES:
BACKGROUND ON FUNDING (2005). Of course, donations of time and effort are not accounted 
for by anyone—and may be more than twice as valuable as donations of money. 
 Some further back-of-the-envelope calculations reveal that approximately 80% of the 
roughly $16 billion of nonprofit arts organizations’ contributed income (from all sources public 
and private) in 2006 was nominally provided by private donors (and 20% by direct public 
support). See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW THE UNITED STATES FUNDS THE 
ARTS, supra, at 1. However, because of the indirect tax subsidy discussed herein, the actual 
incidence of this support is split between private and public sources in something closer to a 
60%-40% ratio. The impact of the current financial crisis and the attendant governmental 
spending on these estimates is unknown but likely to be large; nonetheless, the essential 
point that indirect support is of the same magnitude as direct support remains. 
 3. Even the NEA, in its definitive report, How the United States Funds the Arts, only 
notes that “[t]he figures on government support exclude the enormous indirect subsidy the 
federal government provides by making cultural contributions tax-deductible.” NATIONAL 
ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW THE UNITED STATES FUNDS THE ARTS, supra note 2, at vi. 
Many commentators, including the NEA itself, laud the “ingenious diversity and endless 
creativity of ways in which the arts are funded in the United States.” Id. at v.; see also
COWEN, supra note 2, at 3 (positing that American arts policy’s decentralization “encourag-
es artistic creativity, keeps the politicization of art to a minimum, and brings economics 
and aesthetics into a symbiotic relationship.”); cf. BILL IVEY, ARTS, INC.: HOW GREED AND 
NEGLECT HAVE DESTROYED OUR CULTURAL RIGHTS 200(2008) (observing that “[n]onprofit 
status became important to the fine arts with tax legislation in 1916 and 1917”). 
 4. “For the United States, cultural policy still languishes as the final, mostly unex-
plored realm of public policy.” IVEY, supra note 3, at 21. 
 5. See, e.g., COWEN, supra note 2, at 1-30 (describing perspectives on government 
funding for the arts); IVEY, supra note 3, at 21 (arguing that a “Cultural Bill of Rights”  
is needed to “engage heritage and expand individual creative capacity”); Congress Targets 
Philanthropy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123008104731031939.html.   
 6. The $50 million for the NEA was in the original House version of the bill. The 
subsequent Senate version of the bill did not include the NEA funding (but did include an 
amendment (that passed by a 73-24 vote) prohibiting stimulus funding for arts centers, 
theaters, and museums). Even arts-supporting Democrats, such as Senator Diane Feins-
tein of California, voted for the amendment, citing the need to “invest in critical infrastruc-
ture.” An intensive lobbying effort by arts groups and sympathetic legislators preserved the 
NEA funding in the final version of the bill (and eliminated the amendment that would 
have excluded certain arts entities from any recovery money). Nonetheless, opponents of 
the bill such as Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia, the third-ranking House Republi-
can, continue their criticism, calling the NEA funding, among other things, “pork barrel 
spending.” Critics such as Georgia Representative Jack Kingston have additionally called 
for a reexamination of all of NEA’s funding.  Michael Kranish, Stimulus Funding for Arts 
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proportionate controversy over 0.006% of the stimulus package com-
bined with recent calls for a congressional re-examination of the cha-
ritable deduction in general (and a return to the “classical” concep-
tion of charity) continue the pattern of regular and persistent contro-
versy surrounding arts funding.7
 The timelessness of the debate surrounding arts policy suggests 
the universality of the underlying issue—the need to balance aesthet-
ic and economic sensibilities that “is a general prerequisite of ration-
al policy evaluation.”8 In an economic age of information and creativi-
ty, arts policy is an important indicator of how the United States 
supports creative endeavors generally. 
 Given the astronomical numbers being thrown around with re-
spect to federal fiscal outlays in the coming years, the financial 
stakes involved in public arts funding are relatively small (especially 
in light of its symbolic significance). This fact, along with the advan-
tages of decentralized support over direct support and the dire straits 
in which many arts organizations find themselves, suggest an oppor-
tunity to improve and expand, rather than curtail, the federal tax 
code’s implementation of national arts policy.9
 Part II of this Article discusses the justifications for public support 
for the arts and the two general institutional alternatives for deliver-
                                                                                                                                       
Hits Nerve: Some Doubt Jobs Would be Created, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2009, National 
Section, at A1. 
 7. See, e.g., Suzanne Perry, Paying It Forward—and Back, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Sept. 4, 2008 (quoting ranking Senate Finance Committee member Senator Charles Grass-
ley (R-IA) and Finance Committee Chairman Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) regarding the 
likelihood of congressional hearings on the charitable deduction, and Democratic Con-
gressman Xavier Becerra, a member of the House Ways and Means Committee, regarding 
limiting the charitable tax deduction to contributions to organizations that can show their 
direct service to the poor and disadvantaged). The President’s 2010 budget, in addition to 
the increased NEA funding, also includes a proposal to limit the tax subsidy for (itemized) 
deductible expenses (such as charitable donations) at twenty-eight cents for each dollar of 
deductible expenses for taxpayers with incomes in excess of $250,000 (the subsidy for each 
additional dollar of deductible expenses under current law is equal to the taxpayer’s  
marginal tax rate, which for the top two tax brackets is 33% and 35%). Philip Rucker, Ob-
ama Defends Push to Cut Tax Deductions for Charitable Gifts, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2009, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/25/ 
AR2009032503103_pf.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
 8. Cowen, supra note 2, at 3; see also Bill Ivey, The Corrosive Incoherence of the U.S. 
Arts System, HEDGEHOG REV., 51, 52 (Summer 2004). (“[O]utcomes in art are determined 
by systems that advance or constrain the creative process.” Thus, the fate of the arts will 
be resolved by public policy, “because that is where society engages the norms and archi-
tecture of arts systems, the assumptions and categorical distinctions that define the bal-
ance among the key ingredients of art making: artistic vision, economic vitality, and the 
public interest.”). 
 9. This Article accepts the by no means universally accepted proposition that the tax 
system is a capable and appropriate vehicle for carrying out such a non-tax policy as arts 
support. An analysis of the proposition’s validity is beyond the scope of this Article, but the 
entrenched reality of the tax code’s sprawling mandate suggests that no relevance is sacri-
ficed by accepting the proposition.  
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ing that support—direct support, exemplified by funding for and by 
the NEA, and indirect support, as exemplified by the tax subsidy that 
is the subject of this Article. Part II concludes that, as a general mat-
ter, the justifications for arts funding warrant indirect support via 
the tax subsidy. Part III examines the current implementation of the 
tax subsidy for arts organizations via the application of I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3) and identifies how this mechanism for decentralized fund-
ing, despite its successes, does not fully address the concerns justify-
ing its existence. Part IV recommends that, in order to more fully ca-
pitalize on the strengths of our decentralized arts funding policy, 
Congress should amend I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to explicitly list arts organ-
izations as eligible for tax exempt status. 
II.   PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ARTS
A.   Justifications: Market Failure and Democracy-Enhancing 
Positive Externalities 
 There is vigorous public and academic debate regarding the ques-
tion of whether or not support for arts is a proper function of gov-
ernment, and if so, how government should execute that function. 
While recognizing that there is no agreement regarding whether the 
arts, or a variety of endeavors, should be publicly funded, let alone 
the justifications for such funding, this Article accepts a particular 
set of justifications for arts funding and assesses the effectiveness of 
the tax subsidy in light of those justifications. Specifically, this Ar-
ticle accepts the economic description of market failures to explain 
why arts are deserving of public support and an account of art’s posi-
tive externalities that, according to the statutory declaration of find-
ings and purposes, motivated Congress to create the NEA. 
 To the extent there is a generally accepted economic justification for 
the public support of the arts, it is, in economic terms, the failure of 
the market to properly account for art’s positive externalities.10 As a 
public good, like information itself, the production and consumption of 
art produces societal benefit that exceeds the amount of personal bene-
fit economic decision-makers take into account when making art re-
                                                                                                                                       
 10. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 848-
54 (1980) (“[E]ach individual should contribute toward [the] production [of a public good] 
equal to the value he places upon it . . . . However, individuals have an incentive to contri-
bute little or nothing.”) [hereinafter Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise]; Henry 
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income 
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 66 (1981) (“[I]n order to determine whether the exemption is 
good policy…justification might be sought…in the existence  of uncompensated benefits 
(‘beneficial externalities’) that the activity brings to the society at large.”); see also 20 
U.S.C. § 951(7) (2006) (“[I]t is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to 
help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, 
and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating the release of this creative talent.”) 
[hereinafter Hansmann, Rationale]. 
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lated decisions, such as whether or not to fund artistic endeavors with 
pre-tax dollars or exempt from tax the income of arts organizations.11
 There are numerous interrelated theories regarding why the mar-
ket fails to properly account for art’s positive externalities. For ex-
ample, the “productivity” market failure faced by services and labor 
(of which the arts are a very special case) arises because technologi-
cal advances cause capital productivity growth to outpace human 
productivity growth.12 The “capital markets” theory of market failure 
with respect to the arts suggests that subsidization is appropriate be-
cause nonprofits that provide public goods cannot access public mar-
kets for capital.13
 Another account of the market failure problem when it comes to 
art is a version of the familiar “free rider” problem.14 A free rider 
problem exists when markets do not provide sufficient incentives to 
pay for art at the optimal level because, whether one pays or not, one 
will receive some of the benefits from the art that is paid for by oth-
ers.15 A compelling corollary of the free rider problem that is of long-
term national concern is the intergenerational externality theory, 
which posits that the market fails to account not only for contempo-
raneous positive externalities, but also for the preferences of future 
generations.16 This is an especially relevant consideration in the art 
                                                                                                                                       
 11. Generally, economists define “public goods” as any good the use of which by one per-
son does not preclude anyone else’s use and the access to which cannot be denied whether or 
not one has paid for it. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 10, at 
848. While arts organizations such as museums can in some instances restrict access to works 
of art (for example, to a finite number of paying customers), it cannot preclude the enjoyment 
of art’s externalities. For an argument that art is not a public good, see generally Andrew 
Chamberlain & Mark Sussman, Charities and Public Goods: The Case for Reforming the Fed-
eral Income Tax Deduction for Charitable Gifts, TAX FOUNDATION SPEC. REP., No. 137, 8 Nov. 
2005 (describing economic pressures on the performing arts which are “a consequence of what 
might be considered the technology of their operations”).  
 12. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS—THE
ECONOMIC DILEMMA: A STUDY OF PROBLEMS COMMON TO THEATRE, OPERA, MUSIC AND 
DANCE (1966). 
 13. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 10, at 848-54. 
 14. JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 100-13 
(1995); see also Mark Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1393, 1398-1406 (1988) (justifying charitable deduction in part as response to free rid-
ing); David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and 
the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 224 (2009) (identifying and analyz-
ing three “information” or “incentive” problems justifying subsidized charity: the free-rider 
problem, measurement and responsiveness to popular preferences regarding public goals, 
and recruiting private donors to monitor quality in the nonprofit sector). Regarding how 
donors respond to subsidies, see generally Gerald E. Auten, Charles T. Clotfelter & Richard 
L. Schmalbeck, Taxes and Philanthropy Among the Wealthy, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?: THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 392 (Joel B. Slemrod, ed., 2000). 
15. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 14, at 101.  
 16. See Baumol & Bowen, supra note 12, at 385 (intergenerational externality prob-
lem is the case “par excellence” for public support); see also Barbara Hoffman, Law for Art’s 
Sake in the Public Realm, 16 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 39, 44 (1991) (“It is . . . ironic that con-
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context, as the true value of art is often not known until long after its 
production and initial reception.  
 Market failure descriptions are, of course, based upon the exis-
tence of art’s positive externalities. The literature tends to gloss over 
this part of the inquiry; the necessary task of actually describing the 
nature of art’s positive externalities is more difficult than instincts 
might lead one to believe. Indeed, “[w]henever law seeks to protect or 
encourage the arts, it, like many other institutions, assumes that the 
arts are intrinsically valuable.”17 This is not a particularly satisfacto-
ry description of the virtues of art from an intellectual perspective. 
Furthermore, such a justification for public support of the arts is un-
likely to be persuasive to one who has not already internalized art’s 
putatively intrinsic personal and societal benefits. Nor is such a tau-
tology likely to yield well-designed, targeted, and effective support 
programs. A more thoughtful and explicit reckoning of art’s benefits 
is required in order to properly evaluate and suggest improvements 
to current arts funding policy. 
 If we think art is valuable to the public as a whole only because it 
is educational, then it makes sense to require that arts organizations 
demonstrate that they serve strictly educational purposes (as under 
current tax law). If, however, we think that the value in art also lies 
in some of its other characteristics, the formulation of sound policy 
requires that we identify these characteristics as well. The assump-
tion that art is educational is not immutable. As politics and public 
opinion shift over time, it might not always be the case that art is as-
sumed to be inherently educational and thus worthy of I.R.C. 
§501(c)(3)’s blessing. At any rate, the rationale for supporting art 
might dictate different policy than the rationale for supporting edu-
cation more generally. 
 The security of this nation’s commitment to the arts is best served 
by identifying benefits from art that are not dependent upon circular 
and politically charged assumptions. Drawing upon the findings in the 
NEA’s authorizing statute, this section outlines a set of justifications 
in support of the federal income tax exemption for arts organizations 
that captures art’s unique benefits vis-à-vis democracy—its ability to 
resist hegemony, to promote the private intellectual freedom that is a 
prerequisite to public spheres of freedom, and to counterbalance and 
complement scientific and technological advancement. 
 As many commentators have noted, justifications for arts funding, 
whether direct or indirect, generally fall into one of two groups—the 
economic justifications or the sociological/political/aesthetic justifi-
                                                                                                                                       
troversial public art works . . . often become prized civic icons as public understanding 
grows and deepens with the passage of time.”).  
 17. Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 810 (2005). 
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cations.18 Although useful for purposes of discussion and analysis, the 
bifurcation of justifications for arts support noted by so many scho-
lars is not inevitable. Professor Colombo’s “enhanced access” theory is 
an example of another way to resolve the apparent duality. 19 Profes-
sor Colombo argues that “enhancing access” fits both explanations 
and should be the primary criterion upon which a determination of 
tax exemption for charitable organizations is based because it simpli-
fies a difficult inquiry and focuses nonprofits on their duty to provide 
something the market does not.20 This Article posits a synthesized 
justification for arts support: the positive externalities giving rise to 
the market failure (pursuant to economic theory) are, in fact, based 
on aesthetic, noneconomic concerns.21
 Art is most profoundly in the national interest because of the way 
in which it affects the quality of our cultural life and the functioning 
of our democracy.22 The market on its own fails to properly account 
                                                                                                                                       
18. Professor Schuster writes, “A complete analysis of a tax incentive would evaluate 
it from two perspectives: with respect to its economic effects and with respect to its cultural 
and aesthetic effects.” Schuster, supra note 2, at 32. Professor Cowen notes the difficulty in 
reconciling “economic and aesthetic values.” COWEN, supra note 2, at 3. Professor Colombo 
identifies two groups of theories: “sociological/political” and “economic.” John D. Colombo, 
The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 364 (2004).   
 19. Professor Colombo also identifies (and discounts) two lines of reasoning that resist 
categorization in one of the two identified groups: the “income definition” theory and the 
“relief of governmental burden” justification. Colombo, supra note 18, at 364 n.84;  cf. Boris 
I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal 
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976) (discussing congressional enactments  exempting 
from taxation nonprofit versus profit-making corporations). This Article ignores the “in-
come definition” theory of tax exemption because I argue herein that commerciality is 
somewhat of a red herring in evaluating the eligibility of arts organizations for tax exemp-
tion; it may very well be the case that arts organizations pursue their goals via, at some 
level, seeking to produce income. The “relief of governmental burden” formulation in prac-
tice authorizes a set of activities that roughly aligns with the more “classical” definition of 
charity. If taken literally as an overarching theory, the formulation is too narrow to be con-
sidered practical given the tremendous variety of subsidized charitable endeavors (but see 
note 7 regarding possible congressional reconsideration of the scope of the charitable de-
duction). If read liberally, the issue becomes the definition and scope of governmental bur-
dens and whether or not they include the responsibility to correct market failures—a dis-
cussion to which this paper’s arguments are adaptable. 
 20. Colombo, supra note 18, at 345-46.
 21. It is often claimed that support for the arts creates jobs and bolsters the economy; 
in other words, it provides positive externalities that are economic in nature. The advocacy 
group Americans for the Arts, for example, reports that nonprofit arts organizations gener-
ate approximately $166 billion for the economy each year, supply almost $30 billion in tax 
revenue, and provide the equivalent of full-time employment for 5.7 million people. Ameri-
cans for the Arts, Arts & Economic Prosperity III: The Economic Impact of Nonprofit Arts 
and Culture Organizations and Their Audiences, at 3, http://www.americansforthearts.org 
/pdf/information_services/research/services/economic_impact/national_findings_summary_ 
report.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). However, this line of argument alone is unsatisfac-
tory as a justification for arts funding in particular because arts are not unique in their 
provision of ancillary economic benefits to their practitioners and communities. It is, in 
fact, their noneconomic contributions to society that make the arts special. 
 22. See 20 U.S.C. § 951(4) (2006) (“Democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citi-
zens. It must therefore foster and support . . . access to the arts and the humanities, designed 
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for these sociological/political/aesthetic qualities of art. To the extent 
public support is the proper response, the question remains how to 
structure that response.  
 Under the synthesized justification explained above, there are two 
broad reasons for governmental support of the arts. Art uniquely 
creates democracy-enhancing and nation-strengthening externalities 
by:
1) Fostering national respect and international leadership com-
mensurate with, and complementary to, the nation’s promi-
nence in other endeavors (so-called “soft power”); in particular, 
art serves as a counterbalance to technological and scientific 
advancement; and 
2) Contributing to the intellectual freedom and versatility that is 
required for a democracy to function properly. 23
                                                                                                                                       
to make people of all backgrounds and wherever located masters of their technology and not 
its unthinking servants.”) (emphasis added); see generally ELLEN DISSANAYAKE, HOMO 
AESTHETICUS: WHERE ART COMES FROM AND WHY 3 (1992) (arguing “answers to human 
questions and desires are to be found in (what should be evident in the name we give them) 
‘humanities’ ”); ELLEN DISSANAYAKE, WHAT IS ART FOR? (1990) (arguing that art-making is a 
trait of human evolution—derived from the mother-child interaction—that fosters communi-
ty, social coherence, and love); PAUL WOODRUFF, THE NECESSITY OF THEATER: THE ART OF 
WATCHING AND BEING WATCHED (2008) (arguing that theater is necessary “to secure our 
bare, naked cultural survival” because it fosters empathy and ethicality). 
 23. Arts support also serves to enhance democracy by preserving America’s unique 
and globally important cultural heritage. This justification is perhaps the most widely ac-
cepted (and inherently conservative) justification of public support for the arts. See 20 
U.S.C. § 951(6) (2006) (“The arts and the humanities reflect the high place accorded by the 
American people to the nation’s rich cultural heritage and to the fostering of mutual re-
spect for the diverse beliefs and values of all persons and groups.”). Implicating the inter-
generational externality theory discussed above, theorists such as Ronald Dworkin have 
made the case that cultural preservation is an appropriate state function because it pre-
serves a store of cultural “language” from which citizens can draw when choosing among 
conceptions of the good life. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 229-30 (1985) 
(stating that a “rich cultural structure . . . multiplies distinct possibilities or opportunities 
of value”). John Dewey formulates the point in more dramatic terms: “The works in which 
meanings have received objective expression endure. They become part of the environment, 
and interaction with this phase of the environment is the axis of continuity in the life of ci-
vilization.” JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 326 (1958). Even more dramatically, upon 
signing the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act (establishing the 
NEA), President Lyndon Johnson said, “Art is a nation’s most precious heritage. For it is in 
our works of art that we reveal to ourselves and to others the inner vision which guides us 
as a nation. And where there is no vision, the people perish.” JOSEPH WESLEY ZEIGLER,
ARTS IN CRISIS: THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS VERSUS AMERICA 17 (1994). The 
statute establishing the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities identified its 
purpose to “develop and promote a broadly conceived national policy of support for . . . in-
stitutions which preserve the cultural heritage of the United States . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 
953(b) (2006). Institutions such as the Library of Congress and the Smithsonian Institute 
illustrate the government’s commitment to, and public support for, cultural preservation 
efforts. There is relatively little controversy regarding the bulk of direct governmental sup-
port for the arts that relates to cultural preservation efforts. Direct support, such as via the 
NEA and to the Smithsonian Institution, and indirect support generally work together ef-
fectively toward the same goal with respect to this aspect of public support for the arts. For 
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1.   Soft Power and Counterbalance to Science 
 There are a number of ways in which support for the arts can en-
hance the nation’s soft power.24 What Professor Cowan has identified 
as the “prestige argument” posits that arts funding has value by vir-
tue of enhancing national symbolism and prestige and that U.S. tax-
payers can and do appreciate this value even if they are unwilling to 
pay directly for art themselves.25 Even if the arts would flourish 
without subsidies, the benefit, according to this argument, is in hav-
ing “a state that honors creativity and backs up that honor” with ex-
penditures.26 For many, government support for the arts supplies 
something that the market by definition cannot—government support 
for the arts. For such taxpayers, living in a society that values and 
supports the arts is in and of itself a “good” that they would argue re-
dounds to the benefit of everyone.27
 The arts are also a determinant of the country’s international 
standing. Perhaps one of the only aspects of American society to con-
sistently generate mostly positive worldwide reaction is its creative 
output. The arts, aided by public support and taken as a whole, have 
been a constant source of international goodwill.28 Art and culture are 
                                                                                                                                       
this reason, this justification is not discussed at length with respect to the unique advan-
tages of indirect support. 
 24. See 20 U.S.C. § 951(8) (2006) (“The world leadership which has come to the United 
States cannot rest solely upon superior power, wealth, and technology, but must be solidly 
founded upon worldwide respect and admiration for the Nation’s high qualities as a leader 
in the realm of ideas and of the spirit.”). Barack Obama’s presidential campaign policy pa-
per on the arts cites America’s need to support greater arts education so as to “remain 
competitive in the global economy” by expanding partnerships between schools and arts 
organizations, creating an “Artist Corps” of educators to work in low-income schools, in-
creasing NEA funding, and promoting cultural diplomacy. “Artists can be utilized again to 
help us win the war of ideas against Islamic extremism.” Obama for America, Barack Ob-
ama: A Champion for Arts and Culture, http://www.artsactionfund.org/pdf/artsvote/ 
Obamaarts2.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).  
 25. COWEN, supra note 2, at 24-27. 
 26. Id. at 25. 
 27. The good feeling many get from living in a society that funds the arts is akin to a 
“warm glow”—the benefit one gets from the knowledge that one’s gift is the source of some-
one else’s pleasure. See LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS
261 (2008). One might also generate the same warm glow by directing public money to a 
chosen donee. Gifts such as charitable contributions generate positive externalities by 
creating “double utility”—utility for both the donor and the donee (and in some cases, for 
society generally). See Schizer, supra note 14, at 230-31. This notion may help explain why 
arts funding centers on fine art rather than popular culture: in terms of prestige, govern-
ment funding of popular culture might confer upon the government just the opposite—
negative prestige. For particular Americans, of course, any government funding of the arts 
creates negative prestige because of the whiff of socialism or the forced association of the 
arts with governmental bureaucracy. COWEN, supra note 2, at 144.  
 28. Public support has helped the United States lead the way in jazz, modern archi-
tecture, abstract expressionist painting, abstract art, contemporary classical composition, 
avant-garde fiction and poetry, street art, modern dance, and even Hollywood action mov-
ies. See COWEN, supra note 2, at 2-3. President Obama’s campaign website exclaims that 
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important implements of informal diplomacy and soft power.29 As 
such, a flourishing, unhindered, publicly supported arts sector con-
tributes in real ways to the nation’s international standing.  
 One such way is by complementing the nation’s technological ad-
vances. Explicit in the National Foundation on the Arts and Humani-
ties Act’s precatory language is the notion that a flourishing arts  
sector is a national priority because of its instrumental role as  
a counterbalance to the nation’s technological sophistication and  
scientific advancement. 
 An advanced civilization must not limit its efforts to science 
and technology alone, but must give full value and support to the 
other great branches of scholarly and cultural activity in order to 
achieve a better understanding of the past, a better analysis of the 
present, and a better view of the future.30
. . .  
 The world leadership which has come to the United States can-
not rest solely upon superior power, wealth, and technology, but 
must be solidly founded upon worldwide respect and admiration 
for the Nation’s high qualities as a leader in the realm of ideas and 
of the spirit. 31
 It is important, then, that the arts be put on an equal footing with 
public support for science and technology. Efforts at establishing  
a “third culture” between modern society’s two cultures of science  
and the humanities acknowledge the important interrelationship be-
tween them with respect to solving the world’s problems. This rela-
tionship is further discussed in the context of I.R.C. §501(c)(3) in Part 
III.B. below. 
                                                                                                                                       
“Our nation’s creativity has filled the world’s libraries, museums, recital halls, movie hous-
es, and marketplaces with works of genius.” Obama for America, supra note 24.  
29. The Cold War was the peak of direct governmental arts support. Policymakers 
saw the arts as a potent propaganda weapon, believing that “if American culture could be 
shown to be strong and creative, democracy would look good.” COWEN, supra note 2, at 74; 
see H.R. REP. NO. 618, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186, 3191 (claiming the authorizing 
statute would create a National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities that “would serve 
not only to deepen our understanding of our friends and allies throughout the world, but 
would strengthen the projection of our Nation’s cultural life abroad and enable us better to 
overcome the increasing ‘cultural offensive’ being waged by Communist ideologies”). Ana-
logous American efforts can now be seen in the Middle East, as the government has poured 
hundred of millions of dollars into efforts such as Radio Sawa (to broadcast popular Arabic 
music and news from an America-friendly perspective) and Al Hurra (regional Arabic-
language television station). See Glenn Kessler, The Role of Radio Sawa In Mideast Ques-
tioned: U.S.-Funded Station Lacks Influence, Report Indicates, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2004, 
at A12; Alvin Snyder, Al-Hurra: Struggle for Legitimacy, ARAB NEWS, Dec. 1, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7&section=0&article=74004&d=1&m=12&y=2005.  
The Obama administration has expressed its intention to increase its use of soft power, in-
cluding the arts, abroad. See Obama for America, supra note 24.  
 30. 20 U.S.C. § 951(3) (2006). 
 31. 20 U.S.C. § 951(8) (2006).  
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2.   Intellectual Check and Balance 
 The value to the nation of a flourishing arts sector also lies in its 
contribution to an imaginative and critical way of thinking that is the 
analog to the multi-branched constitutional structure of government; 
its purpose is to check and balance an enemy of effective democratic 
participation, the tyranny of the status quo.32 In turn, arts funding 
brings the arts “within the push and pull of democratic discourse,” 
makes it a matter of public concern, and elevates its abstract virtues 
above dollars and cents.33
 For purposes of national public support, art’s chief positive exter-
nality lies in its ability to foster the type of anti-tyrannical thought 
necessary for a vibrant democracy.34 The inherently subjunctive, im-
                                                                                                                                       
 32. See 20 U.S.C. § 951(4) (2006) (“Democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citi-
zens. It must therefore foster and support a form of education, and access to the arts and 
the humanities, designed to make people of all backgrounds and wherever located masters 
of their technology and not its unthinking servants.”). John D. Rockefeller III stated in tes-
timony before Congress regarding the creation of the National Council on the Arts, “Demo-
cratic government and the arts are, in my opinion, in league with one another, for they 
both center on the individual and the fullest development of his capacities and talents. To 
freemen, the arts are not incidental to life but central to it.” National Arts Legislation:
Hearing on S. 165 and S. 1316 Before the Special Subcomm. on the Arts of the S. Comm. on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 191, 198 (1963). 
 33. COWEN, supra note 2, at 25. A tempting possibility for the identification of art’s 
virtues is simply its relation to happiness. IVEY, supra note 3, at 99-106 (“If democracy of-
fers a single, overarching promise, it is that our system of government, linked, perhaps, to 
an equitable and energetic economy, will produce widespread happiness. . . . [A]rt unques-
tionably gives us a way to pursue self-realization . . . . Art making is spiritual, long-lasting, 
and . . . relatively inexpensive; it contains and even expands many parameters of a well-
lived life that have to date mostly been attributed to only work, religion, family, and com-
munity. In addition, an engagement with art permits us to indulge our drive toward suc-
cess and self-realization without forcing us to buy into the nastiness of America’s unhappy 
rat race. It is the yin of individual achievement that complements the yang of heritage, 
making our expressive life whole. Thus completed, a rounded expressive life can be a re-
servoir holding the two overarching ingredients of happiness–adventure and security.”); 
see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (interpreting the 14th Amendment’s 
due process clause to guarantee a right to privacy as part of a right to the pursuit of happi-
ness); see also Harry Kalven Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 16 (“[B]eauty has constitutional status too, and . . . the life of the imagination is as 
important to the human adult as the life of the intellect.”). For a discussion of satisfaction 
of the citizenry’s appetite for and enjoyment of cultural activities as a basis for funding art, 
see FANNIE TAYLOR & ANTHONY L. BARRESI, THE ARTS AT A NEW FRONTIER 25-27 (1984). 
See also Pamela J. Lajeunesse, Tax Incentives for Support of the Arts: In Defense of the 
Charitable Deduction, 85 DICK. L. REV. 663, 702 (1980-81) (stating that “89% of the adult 
population believe that the arts are important to the quality of life of their communi-
ties”)(citing Hightower, A Report on the Arts, in 2 COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND 
PUBLIC NEEDS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., RESEARCH PAPERS at 714 (1977)).  
 34. See COWEN, supra note 2, at 29 (“A long tradition in philosophy, as exemplified by 
Plato’s Socrates, argues that the most moving artworks tend to be the most dangerous and 
to hold the greatest appeal to the base parts of our souls.”); Hoffman, supra note 16, at 74 
(“[C]ontroversy is both an inevitable and acceptable part of public art—debate leads to un-
derstanding and acceptance of new ideas.”); id. at 93 (“[G]overnment’s involvement in the 
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aginative nature of making and experiencing art fosters the ability to 
conceive of otherness and how things could be—an ability necessary 
if democracies are to adapt, grow, and evolve. 
 By engaging alternative intellectual dimensions, art forces consid-
eration of realities apart from the status quo, and thereby combats 
orthodoxy of all sorts, including governmental.35 This unique feature 
of art has been explored in the context of constitutional law, which 
recognizes art’s compatibility with the First Amendment’s anti-
tyrannical purpose.36
                                                                                                                                       
arts . . . must offer freedom to artists in order to provide society with the capacity to ex-
pand its horizons and grow intellectually.”). 
 35. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (“[T]he provision of tax 
exemptions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of go-
vernmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life.”) (Powell, J., concurring); see 
also Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 21 (2007) (“The al-
ternative cognitive and sensory world posed by art speech effectively conveys consideration 
of views of reality different than official or accepted ones.”); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Is Art 
Salvific?, HEDGEHOG REV.: THE FATE OF THE ARTS, 36, 42 (Summer 2004) (“[E]ver since the 
days of early Romanticism, [the import of the social otherness of art] has been that in com-
posing and presenting his work of unity and purposeless rationality, the artist both 
launches a critique against the fragmentation, rationalization, and oppression of social re-
ality as we know it, and sets before us an image of an alternative reality; in that way, the 
work harbors the potential of being an agent of social reform.”). 
 36. Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 109 (1996) (“Art—like reli-
gion, political speech, the press, assembly, and grievance redress—is essential to freedom 
from the entrenched institutionalization of government.”). Not coincidentally, the constitu-
tionally protected freedoms other than political speech—religion (explicitly), and the press, 
assembly, and grievance redress (indirectly)—are also covered by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). In the 
landmark obscenity case Miller v. California, the Supreme Court placed artistic speech—
but only if it had serious artistic value—along with speech having literary, scientific, or po-
litical value on the list of nonobscene types of speech. 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).  
 First Amendment doctrine suggests that (certain) art is presumptively protected 
speech. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Visual art is as 
wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamph-
let or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.”); Finley 
v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 682 (9th Cir. 1996) (“As the district 
court explained, the arts, no less than the university, are ‘at the core of a democratic socie-
ty’s cultural and political vitality.’ ”) (citing Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 
F. Supp. 1457, 1473 (C.D. Cal. 1992)), cert. granted, 522 U.S. 991 (1997), rev’d (on other 
grounds), 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) 
(explaining that entertainment (particularly motion pictures) may “affect public attitudes 
and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doc-
trine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”); see also 
Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free Expression? First Amendment Im-
plications of Government Funding of the Arts in the Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 AM.
U. L. REV. 353 (1995) (discussing Constitutional protection of artistic expression).  
 This inquiry, of course, begs the question again: What is art? See Amy M. Adler, 
Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990) (describing the 
difficulty courts might face in attempting to draw a distinction between art and obscenity); 
Richard A. Posner, Art for Law’s Sake, 58 AM. SCHOLAR  513, 517 (1989) (observing that 
judges often must resolve indeterminate questions and might decide “issues of value and 
taste” in art while keeping “public respect” if using “appropriate caution”).  
 There is an interesting dichotomy between how art (and speech) is viewed for fund-
ing purposes compared to an analysis under the First Amendment. As a matter of constitu-
tional law and free speech, “political” art is favored and given the utmost protection. Hoff-
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 It is not, however, solely the political speech aspect of art that im-
plicates its democracy-enhancing values—it is also the nondiscursive 
and nonrational elements of art that are most central to its “liberty 
value.”37 To be sure, much artistic expression has, at some level, both 
rational message driven elements and nonrational, nonsemantic ele-
ments. These latter elements allow for the type of imaginings that 
are “invaluable against the bewitchment of one’s common sense by 
the potent and prevailing powers in society, including those of the 
government.”38 Whether or not rock and roll, science fiction, or poetry 
has a message or is educational, it can excite in one a state of mind 
that is immune from totalitarianism—which operates by homogeniz-
ing what and how people think. The most important tyranny that art 
addresses is a tyranny of the status quo that encroaches upon one’s 
private sphere of thought.39 Democracy is limited by what its partici-
pants can imagine. By expanding the ways in which people observe, 
express, and understand, art can expand the possibilities for demo-
cratic action. In so doing, it addresses the tyranny of the status quo 
that can stifle the country’s ability to change along with an ever 
changing world. 
 * * *  
                                                                                                                                       
man, supra note 16, at 62 (noting that, as a result of a series of Supreme Court First 
Amendment decisions dealing with nonverbal expression, “artistic expression is afforded 
full protection only when the Court perceives that the artist has an evident political mes-
sage or has dealt with a matter of public concern . . . . The danger in these trends is that 
artistic expression, particularly in the less traditional formats or media, may be seen as 
somewhat more marginal in value and deserving of less protection.”) With respect to public 
funding, it is explicitly disfavored.  
 37. See generally Hamilton, supra note 36, at 75, 111-12 (arguing that art’s nonra-
tional, nondiscursive elements are central to the “liberty value of art” and should thus be 
afforded the most stringent First Amendment protection; that direct arts funding should 
therefore be carefully scrutinized; and that arts education should be prioritized); see also
Eberle, supra note 35, at 16 (“[A]rt speech is a protected realm of freedom, outside the con-
trol of government and the majoritarian forces that form conventions and the normal rules 
of society.”); Anthony T. Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311 
(1999). To a certain extent, religious activity shares with art a publicly-sanctioned focus on 
the nonrational dimensions of life. Eberle, supra note 35, at 14. 
 The analogy between First Amendment law and arts funding is again instructive; 
particularly with regard to obscenity. The Miller test for nonobscenity is “serious . . . artis-
tic . . . value.” 413 U.S. at 26. This test is directly related to attempts to discriminate 
against whole categories of art, such as when NEA’s regulations were amended to prohibit 
the funding for art projects that “produce materials which in the judgment of the National 
Endowment for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be considered 
obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the 
sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken 
as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Act of Oct. 
23, 1989, § 304, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 741(1989). 
 38. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 96. 
 39. Hamilton notes the “importance of the subversive, defamiliarizing value of art to 
the ongoing project of liberty” and that “the flourishing [of art] furthers the intangible and 
unquantifiable value of increasing the people’s capacity to resist hegemony.” Id. at 111-12; 
see JEAN DUBUFFET, ASPHYXIATING CULTURE AND OTHER WRITINGS 46 (Carol Volk trans., 
1988) (1986).  
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 To determine that art is worthy of public funding because it pro-
vides unique benefits to the country, however, is not to answer the 
institutional design question of how to best deliver that funding.40
The next two subsections discuss direct and indirect funding in the 
arts context. 
B.   Direct Support: The National Endowment for the Arts 
 The relative merits of direct and indirect funding are well ana-
lyzed in the academic literature. Like most public funding endeavors 
that are sufficiently interesting and complex, the arts funding land-
scape is made up of a variety of direct and indirect support mechan-
isms. Direct support, as exemplified by the NEA, is only the most vis-
ible element of national arts policy. Despite the fact that the tax sub-
sidy (in dollar terms) equals or exceeds direct governmental support, 
the former operates in the shadow of the latter. 
 There are numerous major arts programs in addition to the NEA 
that are directly funded by the federal government, including the Na-
tional Endowment for the Humanities and the Office of Museum Ser-
vices, the Smithsonian Institution (including the National Gallery of 
Art), the Kennedy Center, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 
the Commission of Fine Arts, the Art-in-Architecture program, and a 
variety of military programs, to name a few.41 However, it is with  
respect to the NEA that government arts policy is the most explicit 
and representative. 
The purpose of the [National Foundation on the Arts and Humani-
ties] shall be to develop and promote a broadly conceived national 
policy of support for the humanities and the arts in the United 
States, and for institutions which preserve the cultural heritage of 
the United States pursuant to this subchapter.42
 One rough measure of the success and effectiveness of the NEA is 
the amount of support allocated to it in the yearly federal budget. 
NEA annual federal appropriations peaked in the early 1990s, hover-
                                                                                                                                       
 40. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spend-
ing Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 961 (2004) (discussing generally how best to implement a 
government program “given that such a program is going to be implemented”).  
 41. Cultural policymaking is “spread widely throughout the government through some 
200 programs in at least 30 federal agencies.” CENTER FOR ARTS AND CULTURE AMERICA’S
CULTURAL CAPITAL: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRUCTURING THE FEDERAL ROLE 4 (2001). 
The Department of Defense budget allocation for military bands, for example, has at times 
famously exceeded the entire NEA appropriated budget. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR 
THE ARTS, HOW THE UNITED STATES FUNDS THE ARTS, supra note 2, at 14. 
 42. 20 U.S.C. § 953(b) (2006); see also National Foundation on the Arts and Humani-
ties Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209 §5, 79 Stat. 845, 846-49 (1965) (codified as amended, at 
20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (2006)) (establishing the NEA). Specifically, Title 20 section 951 con-
tains an elaborate, aspirational declaration of findings and purpose with respect to the Na-
tional Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. 
318 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:303 
ing around $170 million per year for the years 1992-1995.43 A con-
certed conservative effort to kill the NEA in the mid-1990s on the 
heels of a series of notoriously controversial art projects that had re-
ceived NEA money resulted in a funding decrease to around $100 
million per year for the years 1996-2001.44 Thereafter, appropriations 
grew moderately but steadily, reaching $155 million in 2009.45
 President Obama’s recent massive economic stimulus package in-
cludes an additional $50 million of funding for the NEA on top of its 
preexisting budget of $155 million, as well as the $25 million for the 
Smithsonian Institute.46 However, this influx of cash was explicitly 
made as a remedial economic stimulus and was made against a skep-
tical congressional backdrop regarding arts funding.47 In absolute 
terms, NEA funding is a drop in the bucket of public arts support 
(not to mention the stimulus package). But with or without the sti-
mulus funding influx, as a relative matter, the NEA remains one of 
the largest single annual funders of the arts in the United States, 
and, until recently, the NEA was the single largest arts funder. 
 At any rate, the importance of the NEA does not derive solely, or 
even principally, from its absolute size in dollars (though that of 
course matters). Its importance exceeds its size because the imprima-
tur of NEA funding confers legitimacy and provides exposure, often 
leads to additional private funding, and can be essential to the very 
existence of the art form being supported.48
                                                                                                                                       
 43. National Endowment for the Arts, National Endowment for the Arts Appropria-
tions History, available at http://www.nea.gov/about/Budget/AppropriationsHistory.html
(last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
44. See, e.g., Cynthia Koch, The Contest for American Culture: A Leadership Case 
Study on the NEA and NEH Funding Crisis, Public Talk: Online Journal of Discourse Lea-
dership, http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/ptkoch.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). 
 45. National Endowment for the Arts, supra note 43. The NEA is congressionally 
mandated to distribute over 40% of NEA grant-making funds to state arts organizations. 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title VIII, 123 Stat. 
115, 172 (2009). Thus, in 2007, the NEA gave approximately $72 million in direct grants 
and gave $48 million to state arts organizations to make their own grants. In addition, 
state government legislative appropriations to state arts organizations totaled over $330 
million in 2006, dwarfing the amount of direct federal arts funding. NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF STATE ARTS AGENCIES, LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS ANNUAL SURVEY: FY
2006 (2007).  
 46. 123 Stat. at 171.  
 47. See note 7 and accompanying text. Increased funding also brings with it greater 
scrutiny, suspicion, and accountability. 
 48. Robert Lynch, head of Americans for the Arts, in pushing Congress for increased 
support of the NEA, said “NEA money has always been seen as probably the most important 
lever that we have in the arts . . . It’s seen as a nod of approval from the federal government 
that this is an important symphony or theater or dance company.” Laurence Arnold, Arts Ad-
vocates Ask for 40 Percent Government Funding Increase, Bloomberg.com, Mar. 12, 2007, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajxh6929.2Yk. The 
NEA estimates that every dollar of direct NEA support generates more than seven dollars in 
additional outside support. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 3, at 3. 
Even controversial NEA (or other) funding that spurs attacks and condemnation also gene-
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 The NEA also symbolizes America’s commitment to, and excel-
lence in, the arts. The organization exists for the purpose of promot-
ing the arts, and the congressional findings and statutory purposes 
underlying its activities are the most explicit and well thought out 
expressions of American public policy toward the arts, regardless of 
the NEA’s ability to actually fulfill those purposes. To a certain ex-
tent the NEA can be seen as a success. It fosters national pride, soft 
power, and “warm glow” for those who derive utility from living in a 
country that values the arts enough to publicly support them and 
helps to preserve the country’s artistic heritage. 
 But the NEA did not emerge from the crisis-filled 1990s with its 
ability to support boundary-breaking, challenging art intact, if it ever 
had such an ability.49 What started with the infamous controversy 
surrounding the partially NEA-funded 1989 exhibits of Robert Map-
plethorpe’s homoerotic photography and Andres Serrano’s “Piss Chr-
ist” photography culminated in a Supreme Court ruling that upheld 
statutory decency standards applicable to art supported by NEA 
funding.50 In addition to being a public relations disaster, the stan-
dards have made it more difficult for the NEA to fund risk-taking but 
worthy artistic expression. Justice Souter, dissenting in National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, presciently noted that artists may 
either censor their work to avoid running afoul of the decency stan-
dard, or “refrain from seeking NEA funding altogether.”51
 The political reality and perception of direct grants has rendered 
the NEA ineffective when trying to play the role of arts venture capi-
talist, which is based on the idea that markets do not always effec-
tively pick winners when it comes to art. Increasing conservatism 
and a rule precluding the NEA from funding most individuals,52 any 
                                                                                                                                       
rates (perhaps unintentionally) publicity for the affected art forms and artists. On the other 
hand, “Support from the NEA has served as a seal of approval for art, which in the past had 
been seen as a ‘safe’ investment or contribution for conservative corporate and individual do-
nors.” Hamilton, supra note 36, at 115 n.164 (quoting NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING 
PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 103 (1995)).   
 49. See, e.g., Kristine M. Cunnane, Maintaining Viewpoint Neutrality for the NEA: 
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1445-52 (1999).  
 50. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998) (upholding 20 
U.S.C. § 954(d)(1), which directs the NEA’s chairperson to ensure that “artistic excellence 
and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] applications are judged, taking into con-
sideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the 
American public”). While it is of course not the case that indecent art is itself automatically 
democracy-enhancing, the focus on decency distracts from the main point that in order for 
important, challenging art to be encouraged, its funding must be unfettered by precon-
ceived notions. Sometimes decency and respect are the opposite of what is trying to be con-
veyed by meaningful art. 
 51. Id. at 621 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 52. NEA funding for individual artists has steadily decreased, though such support is 
ostensibly part of the NEA’s mission. 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (2006) (NEA Chairperson authorized 
to make grants that foster “groups or, in appropriate cases, individuals of exceptional talent 
engaged in or concerned with the arts.”). Since 1997, however, Congress has prohibited the 
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for-profit projects, or more than half of any given nonprofit project 
means that the NEA now largely follows the market rather than 
complements it.53
 The pressures bearing upon the NEA do not necessarily prevent the 
organization from effectively fulfilling the role of preservationist of 
high culture and native and traditional arts and supporter of regional 
and ethnic-based art initiatives.54 However, aside from this limited role 
for which the NEA is well suited, the failure of the NEA to advance the 
national arts agenda55 makes the tax subsidy all the more crucial to 
the national arts funding landscape. Direct support cannot fully carry 
out the goal of fostering the type of art that enhances democracy and 
                                                                                                                                       
NEA from making direct grants to individuals except for Literature Fellowships, NEA Ameri-
can Jazz Masters Fellowships, the NEA National Heritage Fellowships in the Folk & Tradi-
tional Arts, and, starting in 2008, National Opera Fellowships (the latter three being purely 
“honorific” awards, the Literature Fellowships are the only true remaining individual grants). 
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2143 (2007) 
(adding National Opera Fellowships to limited list of permitted individual grants in § 309(1) 
of division E, Public Law 108-447); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-
447, § 309, 118 Stat. 2809, 3094 (2004) (“Of the funds provided to the National Endowment 
for the Arts: (1) The Chairperson shall only award a grant to an individual if such grant is 
awarded to such individual for a literature fellowship, National Heritage Fellowship, or 
American Jazz Masters Fellowship.”); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-83, § 329, 111 Stat. 1543, 1600 (1997) (same); see also
Daniel J. Wakin, N.E.A. to Honor Opera, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, available at
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/nea-to-honor-opera/ (quoting NEA chairman 
Dana Gioia as saying the $25,000 Opera Honors awards have “enormous symbolic value”); 
COWEN, supra note 2, at 98 (“Successes become harder to find, however, once the NEA  
could no longer make significant grants to individual artists and could no longer support  
controversial projects.”).  
 53. See COWEN, supra note 2, at 96 (stating that the NEA “provides marginal funding 
to projects that probably would have existed anyway”). Additionally, by law, 40% of NEA 
funds must go to state arts organizations, which are typically even more conservative than 
the NEA and, at any rate, are subject to the same overall funding guidelines. For these 
reasons, Professor Hamilton argues that government involvement in the creation of art is 
inferior to prioritizing arts education. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 115-17 (“[F]ederal fund-
ing has tended to direct artistic energy away from the production of new and interesting 
works toward the creation of mediocre works. . . . [W]here the instrumental value of art lies 
in its capacity to question and undermine the status quo, the art experts on whom the gov-
ernment . . . depend . . . seem ill-placed.”). The basis for this distinction is unclear (as it 
would seem that arts education would suffer from even greater pressure to conform to gov-
ernment orthodoxy) and at any rate is based upon the assumption that government sup-
port for the arts has taken the forms only of comprehensive support for artists (as in the 
Work Projects Administration’s Federal Arts Project during the Great Depression), and 
project grants under the NEA. Nonetheless, the essential point is that the proliferation of 
art, especially boundary-pushing art, has value in a democracy above and beyond its expli-
cit content or even its educational nature.  
 54. See discussion supra note 23. 
 55. NEA-established peer review panels automatically discount the “new,” and gov-
ernment funding skews (internal) workings of private arts market and causes institutions 
to shape themselves in ways they think will maximize (or at least not jeopardize) their 
funding. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 115-16. Because it is easier to agree about great art of 
the past, governmental artistic successes often focus on the preservation of our artistic her-
itage. COWEN, supra note 2, at 42-45.  
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the country’s soft power by acting as a check and balance on science on 
the one hand and complacency on the other.  
C.   Indirect Support: The Tax Subsidy 
 Decentralized funding supported by the tax subsidy is widely con-
sidered a particular strength of the American system.56 Although 
most purported benefits of tax incentives can theoretically be accom-
plished with properly structured direct assistance,57 a tax subsidy 
has certain structural and practical advantages over direct funding, 
as evidenced by the experience of the NEA, that necessitate its prom-
inent role in arts funding policy.  
 Most importantly for this Article, decentralized funding has the 
advantage of removing certain funding decisions from the political 
process, thereby fostering experimentation and diversity of view-
point.58 The tax subsidy, rather than a direct subsidy, more easily al-
lows for the types of risky and controversial art that contribute to a 
healthy democracy.59 Further, decentralized funding supported by the 
                                                                                                                                       
 56. See 20 U.S.C. § 951(2) (2006) (“The encouragement and support of national progress 
and scholarship in the humanities and the arts, while primarily a matter for private and local 
initiative, are also appropriate matters of concern to the Federal Government.”). “Philanthro-
py, by its very mission, takes risks and strategically invests in the public good in ways  
no government could do.” Steven Gunderson, Letter to the Editor, Private giving, Public 
Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9901E0D91531F93AA15752C0A96E9C8B6 3. For a compelling argument 
that an altruistic purpose, regardless of the good or service provided, in and of itself warrants 
tax exemption because it decentralizes and necessarily diversifies decision-making, see Rob 
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990). 
 57. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) 
(describing use of term “tax incentive” and arguing for superiority of direct subsidies); see 
also Richard Epstein, Constitutional Conundrums in the Public Funding of the Arts, (Mar. 
8, 2000), in Arts Funding and Censorship: The Helms Amendment and Beyond: A Forum 
Sponsored by The Samuel Rubin Program for Liberty and Equality Through Law, 15 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 23, 36-37 (1990) (arguing for matching grants from government: gov-
ernment gives 28% of artist’s total grant, without restrictions, if artist could first raise re-
maining 72%); Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 
TAX L. REV. 187, 191 (2004) (“The distinction between taxes and spending . . . depends on 
pure form.”). In terms of “warm glow,” citizen-supported (and government-subsidized) arts 
funding can give rise to the same feelings of national pride and warm glow that direct 
funding is purported to yield.  
 58. “The genius of the American system is to get most arts support off the direct pub-
lic books . . . American policy provides support for artistic nonprofits but lets donors decide 
which institutions will receive the funds. The government is removed from the role of judg-
ing artistic quality, yet creative activity receives a spur nonetheless.” COWEN, supra note 2, 
at 31-33. 
 59. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 18, at 364-65 (quoting Nicholas P. Cafardi, The 
Third Sector, reprinted in NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 90, 92 (2003) (“America needs voluntary, nonprofit 
groups, not just because of what they do, but because of what they are, because their very 
existence is a guarantee of the diversity that protects the freedom of us all.”)).  
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tax subsidy is itself democratic—it encourages private decisionmak-
ing in the place of government dictates.60
 This yields greater diversity of voices and viewpoints in the public 
discourse and partially addresses an inherent feature of cultural 
markets that is shared with other informational endeavors, such as 
scientific research and development that command governmental 
subsidization. Variety is a necessary precondition for success,61 and 
so the inherent price of a few eventual successes that everyone can 
share is a much greater number of failures.62 This is an issue for di-
rect funding of speculative endeavors generally, and much better 
suited to decentralized funding rather than direct government sup-
port. In the arts context, decentralized funding more effectively ac-
complishes the goal of maximizing variety while offering practical 
advantages over direct funding.63
                                                                                                                                       
 60. The charitable deduction illustrates that “the tax system can be understood as al-
lowing dispersed donors to determine which agents, projects, or causes the government will 
finance.” Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 388 (1998). On the other 
hand, there are arguments that the public support for the arts is in effect undemocratic. A 
progressive rate of tax gives a greater subsidy for charitable giving to high tax bracket do-
nors than to low tax bracket donors. Because high income taxpayers give more to the arts 
than low income taxpayers regardless of marginal tax rate, this leads to the fundamental 
problem that all taxpayers subsidize arts expenditures, the allocation (and, to a certain ex-
tent, the use) of which is largely controlled by wealthy donors. See Schuster, supra note 2, 
at 45 (“The interaction of high marginal tax rates with donor tastes and preferences has 
meant that donations to arts institutions have included the highest proportion of tax ex-
penditures of any charitable sector.”) (citing A. L. FELD, M. O’HARE & J. M. D. SCHUSTER,
PATRONS DESPITE THEMSELVES: TAXPAYERS AND ARTS POLICY (1983)). To the extent the 
goal is maximizing the net amount of arts funding (the benefits of which redound back to 
the population at large), the above set of concerns should be addressed, rather than serve 
to undermine an otherwise superior mechanism for fundraising. The practical alternative, 
centralized government funding, adds its own set of bureaucratic “overhead” costs and, as 
discussed above, cannot effectively address the justifications for support in the first place. 
 61. See Posner, supra note 36, at 518 (“We can bolster the presumption in favor of a 
permissive judicial attitude toward offensive art by noting that the ‘test of time’ that is the 
closest we seem to be able to get to an objective measure of artistic value presupposes, like 
natural selection in the theory of biological evolution (which the test of time resembles), the 
existence of variety, from which history makes its selections.”). 
 62. See COWEN, supra note 2, at 47 (“The next governmental success story is one that 
we cannot yet imagine.”).  
 63. While direct support requires an agency within the executive branch of the gov-
ernment to actively administer the support program, the tax subsidy decentralizes this 
function to a certain extent (with oversight, to be sure, by the Treasury Department and 
IRS, which already exist). Additionally, as a theoretical matter at least, a tax subsidy effec-
tively takes precedence over discretionary direct funding programs because direct aid pro-
grams should only be funded out of tax revenue that is collected after the tax subsidy has 
reduced tax receipts. The existence of deficit funding in the real world of course partially 
negates this point; however, the general point remains that indirect support is often less 
controversial than direct support.  
 It is also worth noting the relationship between government funding and private 
(subsidized) giving. The issue is whether government support encourages private giving 
(“crowding in”), or replaces private giving (“crowding out”). The imprimatur of direct NEA 
funding might encourage private giving to the arts because of the reputational effects of 
NEA funding, the information signaling function served by such funding, and perhaps ex-
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 Determining that decentralized funding is the proper method of 
delivering support does not necessarily address the underlying mar-
ket failure necessitating the public support in the first place.64 If de-
centralized funders have circumscribed funding options, then the 
benefits of decentralization are not necessarily being realized. I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) governs which types of artistic and other charitable organ-
izations are eligible to receive tax-deductible funding. The tax code 
plays the role of gatekeeper with respect to the tax subsidy for decen-
tralized arts support.  
III.   ARTS ORGANIZATIONS UNDER I.R.C. § 501(C)(3)
A.   Current Law 
 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) lists as exempt from federal income tax certain 
organizations that are  
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scien-
tific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or 
to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but 
only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic  
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals.65
                                                                                                                                       
plicit matching fund arrangements (as in the case of public radio, for example). On the oth-
er hand, direct government funding may suggest less need and thus depress private giving. 
See TAYLOR & BARRESI, supra note 33, at 3-6. The NEA estimates that the multiplier effect 
of each grant dollar is 7-8 in terms of attracting private donations and earned revenue to 
the grant recipient. See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, supra note 3, at 3. Indepen-
dent research, although incomplete and inconclusive, suggests that the relationship be-
tween government funding and donations is not linear and, in the case of the performing 
arts at least, low levels of direct government funding induce private support; but when 
government subsidies reach about one-quarter of organizations’ total budgets, private 
funding gets crowded out. Arthur C. Brooks, Public Subsidies and Charitable Giving: 
Crowding out, Crowding in, or Both?, 19(3) J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 451 (2000); see 
also Arthur C. Brooks, Is There a Dark Side to Government Support for Nonprofits?, 60(3) 
PUB. ADMIN. REV, 211 (2000). 
 64. Professor Cowen and others, however, make too much of the decentralization ar-
gument. When Professor Cowen states that “[t]he American tax system thus favors decen-
tralization of nonprofit activities, rather than any particular conception of art,” he is over-
looking the requirement that art endeavors need be sufficiently “charitable” or “education-
al” in order to qualify for tax-deductible funding. COWEN, supra note 2, at 41. While he 
does acknowledge that the system “inevitably favors some artistic visions over others, 
whether intentionally or not,” he identifies the projects that are favored as those that “can 
earn niches in a decentralized world.” Id.
 65. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (2006). § 501(c)(4) also provides for exemption of “social wel-
fare organizations” that are not organized for profit but operate exclusively for the promo-
tion of social welfare. “Social welfare” has taken on a broad, catch-all meaning and has de-
fied precise definition. Generally, social welfare organizations are meant primarily to pro-
mote the common good of the community as a whole rather than benefit a private group of 
citizens. See, e.g., Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1963) (stat-
ing that a social welfare organization “must be a community movement designed to accom-
plish community ends”). However, membership organizations and in exceptional circums-
tances organizations whose services are available only to members are not automatically 
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The Treasury Regulations relating to these provisions reiterate the list 
of exempt organizations, except organizations that foster national or 
international amateur sports competition.66 In addition, the Treasury 
Regulations further purport to define some, but not all, types of ex-
empt organizations—specifically “charitable,” “educational,” “testing 
for public safety,” and “scientific.” Left undefined are the terms “reli-
gious,” “literary,” “prevention of cruelty to animals,” and, of course, 
“foster national or international amateur sports competition.”67
 “Charitable” can mean, among other things, the “advancement of 
education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, 
monuments, or works; [or] lessening of the burdens of Government.”68
Advancement of the arts is not identified as an endeavor that is inhe-
rently charitable. Instead, arts organizations are typically evaluated 
based upon whether or not they are sufficiently “educational.” 
 “Educational” relates to “(a) The instruction or training of the in-
dividual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities; 
or (b) The instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individu-
al and beneficial to the community.”69 Museums, zoos, planetariums, 
                                                                                                                                       
disqualified under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). An organization whose purpose was to develop and 
encourage interest in painting, sculpture, and other art forms by means of an annual three-
day community art show where admission is free, the work of local and student artists was 
featured, and sale of works was not a requirement for exhibiting, qualified for exemption 
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). Rev. Rul. 78-131, 1978-1 C.B. 156. Compare the result in Revenue 
Ruling 66-178, where a similar organization qualified for exemption under I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3). Rev. Rul. 66-178, 1966-1 C.B. 138. The catch is that for the donor’s income tax 
purposes, contributions to organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) are not deductible. 
I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1), (c)(2)(B). For an argument supporting the elimination of the distinction 
between I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations, see Note, I.R.S. Denials of 
Charitable Status: A Social Welfare Organization Problem, 82 MICH. L. REV. 508 (1983). 
 66. “An organization may be exempt as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) if it is 
organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the following purposes: (a) Religious, (b) 
Charitable, (c) Scientific, (d) Testing for public safety, (e) Literary, (f) Educational, or (g) Pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i)(a)-(g) (1959).  
 67. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)-(5). 
 68. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). Despite the cross-referencing of terms within this 
list, it is clear that each item on the list is a distinct and separate category. See Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 157 (4th Cir. 1981) (Widener, J. dissenting). An or-
ganization can misidentify itself when applying for exemption and still be granted an ex-
emption (so long as it fits one of the exempt purposes). Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii).  
 69. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i). The IRS has long held that promoting the arts 
is “educational.” See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-175, 1964-1 C.B. 185. Certain estate tax provisions 
deduct from the taxable estate the value of transfers made “to or for the use of any corpora-
tion organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or edu-
cational purposes, including the encouragement of art.” I.R.C. §§ 2055(a)(2), 
2106(a)(2)(A)(ii). Note that the language in these provisions generally tracks the language 
in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), except for the inclusion of the words “including the encouragement of 
art.” Note also that the provisions of the U.S. Code dealing with the National Foundation 
on the Arts and Humanities (and the NEA) are contained in Chapter 20 of the U.S. Code: 
Education. 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-960 (2006). “Democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citi-
zens. It must therefore foster and support a form of education, and access to the arts and 
the humanities, designed to make people of all backgrounds and wherever located masters 
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symphony orchestras, and other similar organizations are given as 
examples of educational organizations.70
 This definition seems broad and indeed permits of a wide range of 
exempt arts organizations and activities.71 As a case in point, the IRS 
has explained that a museum’s exempt educational purposes are fur-
thered by “stimulating and enhancing public awareness, interest, 
and appreciation of art” as well as encouraging “a broader segment of 
the public . . . to visit.”72
 The main fault line in IRS and judicial determinations runs be-
tween the categories of “educational” and “commercial,” and the con-
tortions through which the IRS and the courts put themselves 
through in order to distinguish the educational from the impermissi-
bly commercial illustrate that the “educational” category is ill-suited 
for the policy goals justifying public support of the arts.  
 As a general matter, the trend in the public discourse and in edu-
cation policy has been a narrowing of the conception of “educational” 
to an idea of education that is limited to measurable indicia of educa-
tional achievement. In fact, the relationship between the arts and 
educational achievement is far from clear.73 No less an expert than 
Professor Hansmann has identified the IRS’s categorization of the 
performing arts as educational as an act of “expansive reinterpreta-
tion.”74 Furthermore, a focus on commerciality versus education un-
necessarily disqualifies certain arts organizations that would so qual-
ify under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) if their purposes were recognized as ad-
                                                                                                                                       
of their technology and not its unthinking servants.” 20 U.S.C. § 951(4) (2006); see also 20 
U.S.C. § 954(a) (2006) (“Access to the arts through support of education.”). 
 70. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), Example 4.   
 71. The Internal Revenue Manual, Part 7.25.3.7.10, provides, “[t]he promotion of the 
arts and of culture is generally recognized as an educational activity,” and lists, among 
others, the following activities as acceptable: “[p]romoting the dramatic arts,” Rev. Rul. 64-
175, 1964-1 C.B. 185; “[o]perating a nonprofit school of contemporary dance,” Rev. Rul. 65-
270, 1965-2 C.B. 160; “[p]romoting jazz festivals and jazz concerts,” Rev. Rul. 65-271, 1965-
2 C.B. 161; “[g]roup harmony singing,” Rev. Rul. 66-46, 1966-1 C.B. 133; “[f]ellowship 
grants to students or to qualified writers and artists,” Rev. Rul. 66-103, 1966-1 C.B. 134; 
and “[c]onducting annual festivals to provide unknown film makers with opportunities to 
display their films,” Rev. Rul. 75-471, 1975-2 C.B. 207. 
 72. Rev. Rul. 73-104, 1973-1 C.B. 263 (analyzing requirement for nonapplication of 
tax on “unrelated business taxable income” (“UBIT”) that a trade or business regularly car-
ried on by an exempt organization—in this case, the operation of a gift shop selling cards 
that contained information about original artwork in the museum—be substantially re-
lated to the organization’s exempt purpose), considered in IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 35, 146 
(Nov. 30, 1972).  
 73. Recent research has strained the assumed link between arts education and gener-
al education achievement. See LOIS HETLAND ET AL., STUDIO THINKING: THE REAL 
BENEFITS OF VISUAL ARTS EDUCATION (2007) (arguing that arts education is beneficial not 
because it improves standardized test scores generally but because it fosters positive men-
tal habits such as the ability to question, explore, envision alternate possibilities and make 
open-minded judgments). 
 74. Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 10, at 57 n.16. 
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vancing the arts, and it disallows needed support of individual art-
ists. The superiority of indirect support for art may not necessarily be 
applicable to the support of education generally—which, to be sure, 
should include art. The assumed relationship between education and 
art, therefore, should not be relied upon to privilege arts funding. The 
two are conceptually different, and their relationship is dynamic and 
susceptible to reevaluation as political concerns dictate. 
B.   The Problem with the Educational Criterion 
 The following discussion identifies two separate aspects of the prob-
lem with the educational criterion as applied to arts organizations. The 
first is the balancing test between public good and private benefit that 
is applied to arts organizations by virtue of their classification as “edu-
cational.” Second, a focus on the educational aspects of art is akin to 
the focus, in the constitutional law context, on the marketplace of 
ideas and art’s “serious artistic value”: both neglect to fully appreciate 
art’s value to defamiliarize and challenge the status quo.75
1.   Education vs. Commerciality 
 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) requires that an exempt organization be orga-
nized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes. An organization 
meets this test if it engages primarily in activities that accomplish 
one or more of its exempt purposes.76 An organization does not meet 
the organizational test if it serves a private interest rather than a 
public exempt purpose.77 The most important factor in determining 
whether the interest being served is public or private is generally the 
extent and nature of the organization’s commercial activity. There is 
a sliding scale: the public interest being served is weighed against 
the amount of commerciality of the activity. It is not the absolute 
amount of commerciality that is dispositive in a given instance; 
greater or lesser amounts of commerciality and private benefit are al-
lowed depending on the public goal being served. 
 A series of Tax Court cases, Revenue Rulings, and other IRS au-
thorities attempt to delineate permissible educational behavior by 
arts organizations from impermissibly commercial behavior, but the 
                                                                                                                                       
 75. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
 76. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). A single substantial nonexempt purpose disquali-
fies an organization. Better Bus. Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 
U.S. 279, 283 (1945); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). 
 77. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(d)(1)(ii) (“An organization is not organized or operated 
exclusively for one or more of the purposes . . . unless it serves a public rather than a pri-
vate interest. Thus, to meet the requirement of this subdivision, it is necessary for an or-
ganization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private inter-
ests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organiza-
tion, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.”). 
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authorities draw a line that, while apparently permissive, actually 
could end up hindering the advancement of the diversity of art neces-
sary to benefit democratic operations.  
 In Goldsboro Art League v. Commissioner, the Tax Court found 
that an art gallery qualified for tax exemption because it fostered 
community awareness and appreciation of contemporary artists and 
provided subject material for art students by holding art classes, 
workshops, and exhibitions of the artwork of public school children.78
The fact that the organization also operated a public art gallery of 
works selected by a jury and offered for sale to the public—and kept a 
10% commission on art that is sold—did not disqualify the organiza-
tion because the sales activities were incidental to its overall pur-
pose. Also, there was no private benefit to the artists whose works 
were sold as the artists had no control over the jury selection.79
 Commercial sales in and of themselves were also not problematic 
in a variety of other situations not involving private benefit. In Reve-
nue Ruling 73-104, the sale of art reproductions was found to “stimu-
lat[e] and enhanc[e] public awareness, interest and appreciation of 
art.”80 Also, a museum’s sale of art books and reproductions of items 
not in the museum did not generate unrelated business income be-
cause such sales enhanced the appreciation of art generally.81
 Even rentals and consignment sales of art, in the case of a gallery 
located in an area remote from other art galleries, can be deemed in 
furtherance of the permissible purpose of increasing awareness of 
and appreciation for art in a local community.82 Additionally, both 
                                                                                                                                       
 78. 75 T.C. 337 (1980). 
 79. Id. at 344-45. Cleveland Creative Arts Guild v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 
272 (1985), found that an organization similar to the one in Goldsboro was entitled to ex-
emption even though it did not screen the artwork it displayed. Also note Revenue Ruling 
66-178, which holds that an organization that fosters and develops the arts by putting on a 
public art exhibit at which works (selected by an expert panel) of unknown artists are dis-
played (free of charge to the artist) but not sold can qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3). Rev. Rul. 66-178, 1966-1 C.B. 138. 
 80. Rev. Rul. 73-104, 1973-1 C.B. 263. The “frankly commercial scope of the methods 
of distribution endorsed in Rev. Rul. 73-104” made the IRS “not entirely comfortable,” but 
it felt “unable to develop a satisfactory legal rationale for a more restrictive rule.” IRS Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 37,902 (Mar. 28, 1979); see IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,346 (Mar. 15, 1985) 
(discussing cost plus veterinary services in the context of not for profit animal shelters). 
 81. Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264. 
 82. IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-34-001 (Aug. 13, 1986) (noting also that works to be exhi-
bited on a rental basis were selected for exhibit for “based on quality, craftsmanship, edu-
cational value, and professionalism.”). The convoluted nature of such inquiries equating 
promotion of the arts with the permissible exempt purpose of promoting education can be 
seen in another UBIT case involving items for sale at a museum’s store. In a Technical Ad-
vice Memorandum, the IRS found that a museum’s sale of items that “develop a child’s ar-
tistic ability,” such as paint sets and coloring books, is related to its exempt educational 
purpose; but that its sale of items that “develop a child’s motor skills,” such as blocks and 
toy cooking utensils, are not sufficiently related (even though they “arguably teach children 
about shapes and colors”). IRS Tech. Adv. Mem 97-20-002 (May 16, 1997). 
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Goldsboro Art League and Cleveland Creative Arts Guild emphasized 
that there were no other art galleries or museums in the area.83
 The IRS has also allowed commerciality on the part of arts organi-
zations in order to address a specific market failure. In Revenue Rul-
ing 79-369, an organization formed to create, develop, and promote 
an appreciation of contemporary symphony and chamber music was 
granted an exemption even though its primary activity was to record 
and sell (mostly to educational institutions) relatively unknown 
works that are not generally produced and sold by the commercial 
music publishing and recording industry.84   
 Revenue Ruling 71-395, on the other hand, found that a coopera-
tive art gallery ran by approximately fifty artists for the purpose of 
selling their works does not qualify for tax exemption because the 
gallery was being used as a “vehicle for advancing [the] careers” of 
the artist-members who ran the gallery.85 Thus, an organization that 
displays and sells the artwork of “any artist that chooses to become a 
member” is compared to the organization in Revenue Ruling 71-395 
and is deemed a means for serving the private interests of members 
by advancing their careers and promoting the sale of their work, 
“even though the exhibition and sale of paintings may be an educa-
tional activity in other respects.”86 The IRS believes that these organ-
izations provide benefits to their members that outweigh their bene-
fit to the community.    
 These authorities purport to establish that, in the name of educa-
tion, arts organizations can operate commercially in order to sell art or 
art-related items, so long as no actual artists are directly benefitted. 
But the test is not consistently applied even in the educational setting. 
                                                                                                                                       
 83. Goldsboro, 75 T.C. at 344; Cleveland Creative Arts Guild, 50 T.C.M.(CCH) 272.  
 84. Rev. Rul. 79-369, 1979-2 C.B. 226; see also Rev. Rul. 67-342, 1967-2 C.B. 187 (or-
ganization producing and disseminating educational films via commercial television may 
qualify for exemption where the films are presented in a noncommercial manner); Rev. 
Rul. 75-471, 1975-2 C.B. 207 (film festival for independent filmmakers qualifies for exemp-
tion because films exhibited are not for sale and because they were chosen for their lack of 
commercial overtones); I.R.S. N.S.A.R. 20044038E, 2004 WL 2203370 (Mar. 24, 2004 (“[A]n 
organization may achieve its educational purpose so long as the programs are presented in 
a noncommercial manner. The absence of commercial advertising is a key factor in deter-
mining the noncommercial nature of the activity.”). 
 85. Rev. Rul. 71-395, 1971-2 C.B. 228. 
 86. I.R.S. N.S.A.R. 20044014E, 2004 WL 2203359 (Mar. 16, 2004); see also I.R.S. 
N.S.A.R. 20044037E, 2004 WL 2203369 (Jan. 9, 2004) (organization denied exemption be-
cause its only significant activity is an art show that was oriented toward art sales rather 
than art education). The IRS extended the core holding of Revenue Ruling 71-395 to an or-
ganization formed by patrons to promote understanding of modern art by exhibiting and 
selling the work of local artists who did not have to be a member of the organization to 
have work displayed because the artists were being directly and privately benefitted by the 
organization’s activities, even though such benefit was in furtherance of the organization’s 
exempt purpose. Rev. Rul. 76-152, 1976-1 C.B. 151; see also 1988 I.R.S. N.S.A.R. 2159R, 
1988 WL 1523036 (Sept. 14, 1988). 
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For example, in Revenue Ruling 67-392, an organization devoted to 
fostering the abilities of young concert musicians was allowed an ex-
emption despite securing for the artists, free of charge, paid engage-
ments to “improve their professional standing.”87 Here, the organiza-
tion’s educational purpose, to train artists “to the point where they can 
support themselves financially though their musical talents,” was 
served by conferring a private benefit on particular artists.88 Surely 
the test cannot turn on the age of the artist being benefitted. 
 A more relevant approach would be to allow greater commerciality 
in the service of advancing art. The balancing test, with respect to 
the situations governed by Revenue Ruling 71-395, may very well 
have come out differently had the scale weighed private benefit 
against the public interest in art rather than against the public in-
terest in education. The advancement of art entails a concern not 
squarely applicable to the pursuit of education—the necessity that 
the government “create and sustain . . . the material conditions facili-
tating the release of [American] creative talent.”89 The exact identifi-
cation of the underlying purpose matters because the balancing test 
is different depending upon the public interest being served. 
 When it comes to science, art’s supposed counterpart and comple-
ment, private benefit incidental to the furtherance of the public cause 
does not necessarily result in a finding that the scientific research is 
not in the public interest. For example, the IRS has determined that 
a charity that conducts scientific research on behalf of a for-profit 
company is nonetheless serving a public interest.90 In fact, the appli-
cable Treasury Regulations countenance scientific research as in the 
public interest even if intellectual property yielded by research con-
ducted pursuant to an agreement between a nonprofit and a  
for-profit sponsor is retained by such sponsor.91 In other words, inci-
dental private benefit in the tax exempt scientific context does not 
create a presumption of ineligibility for exemption as it does in the 
educational context.  
 Despite the more stringent limitations on commerciality deemed 
unrelated to an arts organization’s exempt purpose, nonprofit arts 
organizations are expected to behave commercially.92 After all, much 
                                                                                                                                       
 87. Rev. Rul. 67-392, 1967-2 C.B. 191. 
 88. Id. at 192. 
 89. 20 U.S.C. § 951(7) (2006). 
 90. IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-05-033 (Jan. 30, 2009). 
 91. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5)(iii)(c)(4). 
 92. See Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of Ameri-
ca’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2440 (2005) (arguing that “[w]e 
should not force charities to embrace the marketplace and pay their own way, and at the 
same time leave in place legal doctrines that punish them for doing so”). Assuming that the 
educational nature of the arts justifies its tax exemption, sales of art could very well fur-
ther the educational purpose of “training of the individual for the purpose of improving or 
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of U.S. culture, including art, is profit-seeking to some extent.93 The 
market-driven mentality is so ingrained that even when we attempt 
to address market failures, we use market solutions such as “venture 
philanthropy.” We increasingly require arts nonprofits to comply 
with commercial demands such as providing quantifiable metrics of 
their effectiveness and efficiency; creating partnerships and develop-
ing models with for-profit entities; focusing on entrepreneurialism, 
marketing, and deliverables; and generating more earned income to 
“pay their own way.”94
 To compound the issue, the conservative mandate of the NEA 
combined with the tax subsidy’s education-commerce distinction has 
divided the art world, for public policy purposes, into either the popu-
lar or commercial, on the one hand, and the elite or educational on 
the other. In the former category, art is treated as a commodity and 
corporate asset, subject only to market considerations; in the latter, 
art is something bestowed upon the public for its own sake by an in-
herently conservative and paternalistic few.95
 Such a bifurcation does not align well with the underlying concern 
of whether or not art is being properly advanced. The distinction be-
tween educational and commercial distracts attention from art’s real 
value to a democracy and fails to place art on an equal footing with 
science. Commerciality is only allowed up to the point where artists 
are actually being benefitted. A fulsome effort at fostering the diver-
sity of art that justifies its public support would weigh public against 
private benefit in light of such a purpose, as opposed to the purpose 
                                                                                                                                       
developing his capabilities,” or “instruct[ing] the public on subjects useful to the individual 
and beneficial to the community.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i)(a)-(b). With regard to 
the former, “[t]he experience of exhibiting and attempting to sell art works is likely to be 
essential for an artist’s development.” Edward J. Rodriguez, Federal Tax Exemption Status 
of the Private Nonprofit Art Association, 10 CONN. L. REV. 653, 661 (1978). With regard to 
the latter, the sale of art work might attract (and thus educate) more of the public and 
make art more widely disseminated, increasing its impact on the public. If the goal is to 
encourage participation in the arts, it appears necessary at some level that artists benefit 
from the funding regime.   
 93. The bright line distinction between commercial art endeavors and nonprofit arts 
organizations is a synthetic one. The two categories are blurred and interrelated. For one, 
commercial culture often draws upon government-subsidized art—using it, in effect, as re-
search and development. Much for-profit art was born of nonprofit beginnings—thus indi-
rect subsidies strengthen the entire arts sector, not just the nonprofit arts sector. 
 94. Kelley, supra note 92, at 2437-39. Professor Colombo sensibly argues that it is im-
possible for charities (such as healthcare providers and arts organizations) to properly 
function in a commercial world without acting in a commercial way in some respects. Thus, 
in cases of “commercial similarity,” the question should be whether the organization pro-
vides access to services for previously-underserved populations or provides specific services 
to the majority population that otherwise are not provided by the private sector. But the 
access theory also relies on the gate-keeping function of § 501(c)(3). “An access-based test, 
for example, would provide little help in defining what is a ‘religious organization’ or an 
‘educational organization’ under § 501(c)(3).” Colombo, supra note 18, at 386. 
 95. “[T]he supply-side demands of refined arts elites are uncritically accepted as gos-
pel.” Ivey, supra note 8, at 53.  
2010]                     FUNDING FOR THE ARTS 331 
of education in general. The fulfillment of such a goal must allow for 
some direct support of individual artists, for where else does art come 
from and how else can the positive externalities of art be generated if 
not by artists? If art were treated more like science, nonprofit arts 
organizations like those described in Revenue Rulings 71-395 and 76-
152 would be allowed to operate as tax exempt, so long as the private 
benefit to the participating artists was in proper proportion to the 
public goals being served, namely, the advancement of art. 
2.   Education vs. Nonrationality 
 Even though “[p]rivate, nonprofit art associations traditionally 
have had little difficulty becoming tax exempt,”96 that might not al-
ways be the case. There is danger that the educational criterion could 
become an instrument of suppression in the same way that NEA de-
cency standards are. In the meantime, reliance on a utilitarian edu-
cational standard that focuses on usefulness and rationality chills on-
the-border arts groups who, for example, desire to pursue controver-
sial, nontraditional, or nondiscursive art, from engaging in such ac-
tivities or from undertaking the burden of applying for exemption in 
the first place.97 The educational criterion also affects the behavior 
and choices of existing groups and places unnecessary restrictions on 
arts organizations that hinder their ability to deliver the positive ex-
ternalities that justify their existence. As in the case of restricted 
NEA funding, overreliance on the “educational” criterion leads to the 
type of conservatism that can make cultural policy ineffective.98 Art 
as education runs the risk that it will validate rather than question 
the predominant worldview if it is narrowly constrained (which ap-
pears inevitable in the educational context).  
 The educational criterion focuses on the relationship between art 
and rational, discursive thought without proper heed for the nonra-
tional, nondiscursive faculties that complete our intelligence and en-
hance our ability to effectively participate in a democracy.99 The sub-
versive and experimental art that is so important to the fostering of 
                                                                                                                                       
 96. Rodriguez, supra note 92, at 653. 
 97. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 566, 621 (1998) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he makers or exhibitors of controversial art will either trim their work 
to avoid anything likely to offend, or refrain from seeking NEA funding altogether.”).  
 98. “[T]he desperate need to retain grant support, patrons, and subscription au-
diences constrains creativity and encourages conservative, repetitious programming that 
is a far cry from the innovation and experimentation envisioned by the [nonprofit] sector’s 
advocates. . . . Competition for audiences and funding among non-profits encourages the 
same kind of conservative artistic choices that are forced on record companies and film 
studios by the demands of shareholder value.” IVEY, supra note 3, at 209, 214. 
 99. Hamilton, supra note 36, at 109 (“While art can address and work through ration-
al faculties, it is neither limited to nor dependent upon them, and even empowers such fa-
culties to subvert their own assumptions. Art stands on much firmer ground if its capacity 
to communicate nondiscursively is recognized . . . .”). 
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liberty is the type of expression most likely to be discouraged by the 
use of a utilitarian educational standard. As in the constitutional law 
context, a focus on the discursive and educational aspects of art over-
looks art’s more abstract nonsemantic properties. Such a focus 
orients the entire charitably supported arts machinery in a direction 
that is askew from its target—the advancement of a variety of art, 
whether educational or not. It is in this way too that the tax subsidy 
mechanism is most suited to arts support, whereas education, for ex-
ample, might present a better case for direct support. 
 Furthermore, the educational criterion and its concern with com-
merciality fail to treat the advancement of the arts in the same way 
that the advancement of science is treated. In the latter case, com-
merciality is accepted as a necessity of the underlying goal of promot-
ing science; in the former, incidental private benefit is presumptively 
in conflict with the underlying public interest. Arts are supported 
when they are strictly educational; but supporting arts for their own 
sake would permit of greater support of the arts and artists without 
whom democracy-enhancing art does not get made. 
IV.   PROPOSAL
The Code has never classified artistic and cultural groups as quali-
fying for tax exemption as such. While the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, under the “educational” tax exempt category, has issued rul-
ings qualifying cultural and arts organizations as tax exempt, the 
lack of explicit statutory recognition of the tax exempt quality of 
cultural and artistic organizations generates unnecessary difficul-
ties for individuals and organizations engaged in these fields. They 
are obliged to meet “educational” standards of dubious relevancy, 
instead of being judged for what they are; a draft horse and a race 
horse may fit under the same general category but it is helpful and 
wise to think of them performing different functions.100
 For the reasons discussed above, this Article’s proposal is to make 
U.S. public arts policy explicit by amending I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to spe-
cifically list arts organizations as eligible for the federal income tax 
exemption.101 By decoupling art from the expectation that it be educa-
                                                                                                                                       
 100. John B. Hightower, President, Assoc. Couns. of the Arts, presented to H. Comm. 
on Ways and Means (Apr. 11, 1973) reprinted in 4 PERFORMING ARTS REV. 74, 78-9 (1973). 
 101. There is precedent for adding a specific term to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 amended I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to include organizations that “foster national or in-
ternational amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the pro-
vision of athletic facilities or equipment).” Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 
1313, 90 Stat. 1520. “Prior policy on the qualification for section 501(c)(3) status has been a 
source of confusion and inequity for amateur sports organizations whereby some gained fa-
vored tax-exempt status while others, apparently equally deserving, did not. The failure of 
some of these organizations to obtain section 501(c)(3) status and to qualify to receive tax-
deductible contributions has discouraged contributions to these organizations, and has de-
terred other organizations from going through the legal expense of applying to the Internal 
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tional, such a change would allow for more commerciality on the one 
hand, and more subversiveness on the other, which promotes democ-
racy-enhancing artistic variety. 
The discussion so far leaves one particularly sticky point—the 
ponderous question that was the impetus for this inquiry in the first 
place: What is art?  
 Art is notoriously hard to define. Philosophers, scholars, jurists, 
and others have been struggling with the issue for millennia. As Jus-
tice Holmes famously wrote, “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking 
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest 
and most obvious limits.”102
 But Professor Farley has observed, and this Article’s proposal 
bears out, that “the legal category of art cannot be avoided.”103 A defi-
nition, for purposes of direct funding, is provided in the National 
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act, which defines “the 
arts” as including, but not limited to the following:  
music (instrumental and vocal), dance, drama, folk art, creative 
writing, architecture and allied fields, painting, sculpture, photo-
graphy, graphic and craft arts, industrial design, costume and fa-
shion design, motion pictures, television, radio, film, video, tape 
and sound recording, the arts related to the presentation, perfor-
mance, execution, and exhibition of such major art forms, all those 
traditional arts practiced by the diverse peoples of this country[,] 
and the study and application of the arts to the human environ-
ment.104
 The IRS has also provided definitions of art for explicit and limited 
purposes such as valuation and depreciation.105 In addition, definitions 
                                                                                                                                       
Revenue Service for recognition of section 501(c)(3) status. Congress believes that it is, in 
general, appropriate to treat the fostering of national or international amateur sports com-
petition as a charitable purpose.” STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX., 94TH CONGRESS, GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976,  423 (1976); see also 1982 EO CPE Text, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopica82.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (de-
scribing IRS position that promotion of sports is not per se educational). 
 102. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
 103. Farley, supra note 17, at 808 (critiquing judicial decisionmaking for making dis-
guised, rather than acknowledged and thoughtful, aesthetic decisions when faced with the 
question of whether or not an object is a work of art). For a survey of definitions of art used in 
various legal fields (such as intellectual property, customs, moral and economic rights, and 
consignment), see Leonard D. DuBoff, What is Art? Toward a Legal Definition, 12 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 303, 351 (1990) (“A universal definition of art probably cannot go much 
further than stating that a work of art is an original expression of the creator, embodying a 
creative process in which the creation is distinctively the work of that creator. A more precise 
definition, although desirable, would not do justice to the diverse interests involved.”). 
 104. 20 U.S.C. § 952(b) (2006). 
 105. Rev. Proc. 96-15,  1996-1 C.B. 627, 627 (outlining details of IRS Statements of Value 
that taxpayers can request and rely upon in completing their federal tax returns that report 
the transfer of art, defined to include “paintings, sculpture, watercolors, prints, drawings, ce-
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of art can be found in various provisions of federal tax law for narrow, 
specific purposes.106 These definitions hew closely to the conservative 
notion of art adopted by the NEA and inherent in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)’s 
requirement that arts organizations be sufficiently educational.  
 As expected, art in the funding context has historically meant 
“fine art.”107 But modernism, not to mention post-modernism (and 
post-post-modernism), have been eating away at that constrictive de-
finition so that many “forms of America’s expressive life” are now 
considered “art” by those whose business it is to define such things.108
 Thus, if only for the sake of conversation, Professor Adler offers a 
tentative two-part definition of art—1) that which is recognized as 
art by the art community (artists, critics, scholars, museums, galle-
ries, and the like), and 2) expression that “makes us ask the question 
‘What is art?’ in the first place.”109 Both parts acknowledge the role of 
                                                                                                                                       
ramics, antique furniture, decorative arts, textiles, carpets, silver, rare manuscripts, histori-
cal memorabilia, and other similar objects”); Rev. Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B. 79 (stating, in gen-
erally disallowing depreciation of the value of works of art, “[a] valuable and treasured art 
piece does not have a determinable useful life”); see also John R. Thompson Co. v. United 
States, 338 F. Supp. 770 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff’d 477 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying Rev. Rul. 
68-232 to determine that oil paintings permanently decorating a restaurant were nondepreci-
able art because they had no determinable useful life);  cf. Judge v. Comm’r, 35 T.C.M. 1264, 
1273 (1976) (finding paintings hung in a doctor’s office to be depreciable “wall decorations” 
and not “works of art” because “the paintings acquired by petitioner were by unknown artists 
and were not of the kind ordinarily considered ‘valuable and treasured’ works of art. The 
paintings were acquired by petitioner for business use . . . .”). 
 106. For example, I.R.C. § 2055(e)(4)(B) (2006) defines a “work of art” as “any tangible 
personal property with respect to which there is a copyright under Federal law.” This defi-
nition is relevant for estate tax and gift tax provisions governing deductions from the ap-
plicable taxable base for the value of charitable transfers of a “work of art” as distinct from 
the copyright therein. See I.R.C. § 2522(c)(3) (2006) (gift tax provision incorporating defini-
tion of “work of art” from § 2055(e)(4)). Another gift tax rule, I.R.C.  § 2503(g)(2)(A) (2006), 
defines a “qualified work of art” as “any archaeological, historic, or creative tangible per-
sonal property.” This definition governs when loans are to be treated as transfers for pur-
poses of the gift tax; a loan of a “qualified work of art” is not treated as a transfer under 
certain conditions. In an analogous estate tax provision that treats works of art on loan for 
exhibition in the U.S. as property in the estate of nonresident, noncitizens, “works of art” 
goes undefined. I.R.C. § 2105(c) (2006). I.R.C. § 408(m)(1) deems the acquisition by an IRA 
of any collectible as a distribution from such an account; I.R.C. § 408(m)(2)(A) defines “col-
lectible” as “any work of art” but does not further define “work of art”. “Collectible” also 
means any rug or antique, any metal or gem, any stamp or certain coins, any alcoholic be-
verage, or any other specified tangible personal property. I.R.C. § 408(m)(2)-(3). Additional-
ly, in calculating the taxable estates of citizens and noncitizens, transfers for the encou-
ragement of art are deducted. I.R.C. §§ 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii).  
 Federal copyright law, it should be noted, extends protection to a much larger class 
of art than only that which is educational; copyrightability is predicated upon some mi-
nimal creative or artistic authorship (which need be only “original,” not necessarily merito-
rious). 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 107. According to the former chair of the NEA, “[t]hat’s pretty much the definition that is 
assumed in conversations in and around our federal arts agency.” IVEY, supra note 8, at 51-52.  
 108. Id. at 52.  
 109. Amy Adler, The Folly of Defining “Serious” Art, in THE NEW GATEKEEPERS:
EMERGING CHALLENGES TO FREE EXPRESSION IN THE ARTS 90, 97 (2004). 
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empiricism in defining art; art can be defined as much by what it 
does as by what it is.  
 While a satisfactory definition of art that accounts for all marginal 
and boundary-testing instances is elusive, Denis Dutton has identi-
fied twelve characteristics—the fundamental features of those things 
that are, across cultures and time, unquestionably art—that help to 
answer the question of what is art.110 Dutton also offers the hope that 
a definition of art need not necessarily “constrain the very creative 
imagination we observe and encourage in the arts.”111
 On the other hand, a number of scholars question whether art 
should be recognized as a legal category at all. Professor Adler has 
argued persuasively that, in the realms of obscenity law and moral 
rights law, the category of “art” necessarily breaks down.112 Contem-
porary art, she argues, is in fact defined by its movement from the 
physical to the conceptual and by “its attack on the coherence of ‘art’ 
as a category.”113 Perhaps it is in recognition of the difficulty of defin-
ing art that federal income tax law with respect to charitable contri-
butions currently dodges the issue by asking whether or not an en-
deavor is educational rather than whether or not it is art. The desire 
to avoid defining art is understandable, and even advisable; but the 
method of avoidance, requiring art to be judged according to educa-
tional criteria, undermines the rationale for arts support. 
 In the end, an explicit definition of art for purposes of I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3) is not necessary in order to implement this Article’s propos-
al. After all, “religious,” “literary,” and “scientific” are effectively left 
undefined, despite their explicit inclusion on the list of eligible tax 
exempt purposes.  
                                                                                                                                       
 110. DENIS DUTTON, THE ART INSTINCT: BEAUTY, PLEASURE, AND HUMAN EVOLUTION
51-59 (2009) (listing direct pleasure, skill and virtuosity, style, novelty and creativity, criti-
cism, representation, special focus, expressive individuality, emotional saturation, intellec-
tual challenge, traditions and institutions, and imaginative experience as the “cluster cri-
teria” reflecting the “most common and easily graspable ‘surface features’ of art”). 
 111. Id. at 63. 
 112. Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009) (arguing 
that the conception of “art” embedded in moral rights law—picturing art as special and un-
like other objects—“is the precise conception of ‘art’ that ‘artists’ have been rebelling 
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 Because we are using the tax code to implement national arts 
funding policy, the mechanism employed should be informed by the 
goals and justifications of arts policy. Explicitly including arts in 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) would effectively protect arts funding from chang-
ing political whims. The promise of America’s multifaceted approach 
to funding the arts can be fulfilled if the governing statute explicitly 
acknowledges art’s equivalence to science on the national list of prior-
ities and art’s unique and necessary contribution to the ongoing 
American democratic experiment. 
